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Local Control:
An Educational Model of Private







We study a society of agents where individual incentives conﬂict with collective ones
and thus individual utility maximization leads to inecient outcomes. We assume that
there is no functioning central institution which can control individual behavior. Instead,
we analyze a system of what we call local control (LC), where the enforcement of punish-
ment lies in the hands of individuals in the society rather than in the hand of a central
institution. The mechanism that governs the spread of control is the educational impact
on an agent being controlled by some other agent, where we distinguish between executed
and threatened punishment. Agents maximize their payos and underlie a constant drift
towards not controlling others anymore. Our main results show that LC can survive if
the educational impact of control is strong enough relative to the drift. If the educational
impact of control is too weak LC breaks down. Moreover, there exists a non{monotonic
punishment eect that sets a trap for standard legal policy advices.
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present circumstances to those which have been
planned, every reform should be allowed to pro-
ceed as much as possible from men's minds and
thoughts."
| Wilhelm von Humboldt (1792)
\[Punishment] does not serve, or serves only
incidentally, to correct the guilty person or to
scare o any possible imitators. Its real func-
tion is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of so-
ciety by sustaining the common consciousness
in all its vigour."
|  Emile Durkheim (1893)
1 Introduction
The question how to restrict liberty in order to protect human beings against each other is
nearly as old as mankind itself. It has driven the works of Thomas Hobbes, Jean Bodin,
Immanuel Kant and many others. But, phrased dierently, it has also been and continues to
be a central question of economic analysis: how to achieve eciency. In general, there may
be many obstacles to reach eciency, but the most important one is, somewhat ironically,
economic rationality itself. If individuals behave opportunistically to maximize their income,
they will ever so often end up in miserable, Pareto dominated states. This imposes a scientic
task going beyond the mere understanding of what happens in the real world: It imposes a
problem of social engineering.
Economics, as part of the social sciences, has a successful history in this matter. Most
prominently, economic theory has provided many insights in how to create markets such that
desirable outcomes are achieved.1
But properly designed markets do not always bring salvation. This is especially apparent
when interaction is local, i.e. when individuals interact only with a small number of others, e.g.
with their neighbors. Despite increased mobility local interaction plays still a prominent role
in our lives. So, can economists oer advice in how to design institutions when the number
of individuals interacting with each other is small? The answer is, of course, it can. In fact,
there is a huge body of literature dealing with such issues, e.g. most of principle{agent theory
is devoted to this very question.
1Recent examples where immediate application followed on theoretical work are the PCS spectrum auctions
(e.g., McMillan (1994)) and Alvin Roth's redesign of the market for young American physicians (e.g., Roth
(1990) and Roth and Peranson (1997)).
1While principle{agent theory or mechanism design usually connes itself to the analysis
of bi- or multilateral relationships, the emphasis of this paper is on the society level. In
our model, which is of an illustrative nature, there is a large population of individuals each
of which interacts with two neighbors. We model this interaction in a way readers will be
acquainted with, namely as a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD). The PD is arguably the simplest and
most widespread illustration of the earlier mentioned problem that rationality itself may be
an obstacle to eciency. In this game there are two individuals who may either cooperate or
defect. Regardless of what the other does, defection always pays individually. Thus, rationality
leads to both players defecting which yields payos Pareto dominated by the payos associated
with mutual cooperation.
There are countless studies showing that certain alterations of a standard one{shot PD
render cooperation rational | hereby claiming to provide explanations of real{life cooperation
(see e.g. the seminal article by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982)). The present
study pursues a dierent goal as it takes for granted that humans do not always cooperate and,
therefore, focuses on the social engineering aspect.
In this paper we are not interested in the possibilities arising when there is a central insti-
tution with unlimited power to exert social control. If there was one, the obvious (and trivial)
solution to the engineering problem would be the enforcement of cooperation by changing the
payos in case of defection, e.g. by imposing taxes or introducing punishments. Then, individ-
uals would no longer play a PD but rather a dierent game where the unique equilibrium has
the desirable quality of being ecient.2 Instead, we analyse a situation where there is only a
weak central institution which can only act once deviant behavior has been reported by citizen-
s. Only, in that case it can punish deviant behavior. Thus, the model reﬂects a world which
may be characterized by private enforcement of public rules. This situation is not completely
unlikely. In a recent article, e.g., Hay and Shleifer (1998) discuss the question of legal reform
in today's Russia. The authors come to the conclusion that in absence of a well{functioning
legal system a promising short and medium term policy is to create public rules which can be
privately enforced. In such a world the engineering problem seems to collapse to the seemingly
simple optimal adjustment of punishments, but as we will see below this adjustment problem
turns out be rather non{trivial.
As agents interact locally and as only neighbours have the opportunity to report deviant
behavior to the authorities (or, in short, to punish or control them) we shall speak of a model
of local control (LC). However, not all individuals will use the opportunity to control or punish
as the act of doing so is costly. Rather, we assume that there are two types of individuals |
types who will never punish (because they are rational and simply aim at maximizing short{run
payos) and types who will always punish (because they are by some internal instance driven
2Okada (1997) analyzes a situation where the decision for the creation of a central institution is endogenized.
2to do so). The latter types shall be called controllers. Both types are assumed to be rational
in the standard sense when it comes to playing the game, i.e. they will defect whenever this is
money{maximizing.
Now one could argue that people punishing others for defection should also have some
intrinsic motivation not to defect themselves. This may be right. But making this additional
assumption would mean making life easier for the (theoretical) survival of cooperation, i.e. in
certain cases there would be cooperation in the model when there would be none without the
additional assumption. But this is a severe problem from the social engineering point of view.
For a social engineer it is of not much help to know sucient conditions for his proposals to
work if he cannot take them for granted. This is the same in the engineering of, say, motor cars
where an engineer proposing a design for a car that will drive if there is no friction between
its wheels and the road would be of little help. Accordingly, we want to make the survival of
decentralized social control as dicult as possible.
A further key assumption we make is that individuals may change their type and for the
same reason we assume rationality when it comes to playing the game we assume that there
is a constant drift away from the social controller. On the other hand, a type who does not
punish may become a controller if and only if he is confronted by punishment himself. Here
we distinguish between threatened punishment and executed punishment.3 This distinction will
be of crucial dierence. In fact, we will show that the solution to the engineering problem
will depend heavily on which of the two educational forces is stronger. Educational eects of
punishments are often discussed as indirect deterrence. Salem and Bowers (1970), for exam-
ple, provide early evidence that formal sanctions can reinforce informal social norms inducing
disapproval of deviant behavior and, thus, yielding more compliance. On a more general level,
educational eects of punishments require that punishments do not only have consequences but
also meanings which can be understood by people. This \expressive dimension" of punishments
is discussed, for example, in Kahan (1996) who also provides empirical evidence.
The possibility of type changes through either education or a drift back is the reason why the
optimal adjustment of punishments is not as simple as it seems. The severer the punishment,
the better the deterrence, one might think. Probably, this is the rst intuition of anybody
familiar with the basics of economic reasoning in law. However, this intuition may go wrong.
In fact, we will show that when executed punishments have a stronger educational eect than
the mere threat of punishments, the amount of punishment has a non{monotonic impact on
behavior. This eect is so strong that when punishments exceed a certain critical level, the
system will experience a total breakdown and will converge to a state in which all players defect
all the time.
3A similar distinction is common in the deterrence literature where the former's equivalent is referred to as
general deterrence and the latter's as special deterrence (see e.g. Beyleveld 1980).
3To the best of our knowledge, the theoretical possibility of such non{monotonic eects has
been discovered by Akerlof and Dickens (1982) who show that these eects can arise when
individuals experience cognitive dissonance after decisions.4 This is in so far related to our
model as cognitive dissonance does something similar in their approach as education does in
ours: It changes individual evaluation of outcomes. In a certain way one could say, it changes
their preferences and, while with common stable preferences incentivesalways have a monotonic
eect, this does not hold when they can change.
On a less applied level we like to claim that our model adds to the understanding of how
social control can work without a powerful central institution. First of all, it does not work
always but may require a lot of ne tuning and if, for example, punishments are dicult to
adjust (because they are not executed by a legal system but purely rely on social sanctions) it
may not work at all. On the other hand, we can see some important ingredients which may make
it work, the most important one being local interaction. Local interaction makes it possible
to ascribe bad things happening to the action of individuals, it makes them identiable and
this is the prerequisite for calculated punishment (in a broad sense). The assumption of local
interaction seems, as already implicitly mentioned above, well{justied. It is not an articial
assumption but rather captures many close{knit aspects which are still important in our lives
(see e.g. Ellickson (1991)).5
In a recent paper Sethi and Somanathan (1997) discuss the evolution of social norms within
a situation of common property resource use, a question that is quite similar to our analysis
of decentralized social control. However, our paper diers from their approach in three main
aspects. First, Sethi and Somanathan study a group of agents where every agent interacts with
everybody else, i.e. interaction is global. In contrast, our model explicitly assumes interaction
to be local, an assumption which is motivated by the observation that social mechanisms are
most likelyto work in local close{knit groups rather than in global anonymous settings. Second,
Sethi and Somanathan choose the replicator dynamics determining the evolution of the system.
We depart from this evolutionary assumption and, instead, take a closer look on the microlevel
of the population. This leads to a more socio{psychologically founded mechanism which is based
on education through punishment. Finally, Sethi and Somanathan note that their approach
\does not allow for institutional change", where \it is possible for more centralized enforcement
mechanisms in the form of explicit laws, policing, and instutionalized punishment to evolve at
the local level".6 On the contrary, our paper can be seen | and in fact should be seen | as
a paper on institutional change, since it captures the idea of a (weak) central institution that
4Earlier Bankston and Cramer (1974) argued that too severe punishments can cause alienation and thus
decrease compliance.
5For why local interaction may yield cooperation in dilemma situations when agents are following simple
learning rules, see e.g. Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998).
6Sethi and Somanathan (1997), p783.
4can make use of a decentrally organized system of social control. In this set{up implications
of dierent law policies can already be addressed explicitly. Moreover, our approach may serve
as a starting point for a general discussion of central and decentral mechanisms of control,
where the co{existence of social norms and legal rules and the co{functioning of centrally and
decentrally organized control is taken for granted.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we build our model of local control. Section
3 contains the analysis and presents the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
We consider an innite population of agents located on the one{dimensional set of integers Z.
Identify each agent with his location and denote agents by x;y;z 2 Z. Interaction is local.
Agents exclusively interact with their two nearest neighbors that are located immediately to
the left and to the right of them. Thus, for any agent x 2 Z the set of neighbors is equal to
fx −1;x+1 g .
There is a game to be played between any pair of neighbors, which we call the neighbor game.
The basic ingredient of that game is a situation where individual and collective incentives go
into opposite directions. For reasons of simplicity and illustration let us assume that this part
of the game is given by a Prisoners' Dilemma game (PD) with a constant gain from defection,
where, without loss of generality, payos are determined from the payo matrix given in Figure
1.
CD
C 2 ; 2 0 ; 3
D 3 ; 0 1 ; 1
Figure 1: A Prisoners' Dilemma game.
Individual optimization in the PD leads to the inecient outcome (D;D). Since every agent
plays the game with both of his two neighbors he thus receives a total payo of 2. In order
to reach a more ecient outcome via cooperation (C;C) it is clear that somehow individual
interests have to be overcome. There exist several possibilities for doing this, all of them
employing some mechanism of control. The mechanism we want to analyze in this paper relies
on what we call a system of local control (LC). In a population with local control there is
no institution that takes care of individual cooperative behavior. Instead, agents themselves
may control each and punish defective behavior of their neighbors by reporting them to the
5authorities. Thus, interaction has two stages | the rst one, where neighbors just play the
game, and the second one, where deviant behavior can be punished.
We assume that agents are one of two types, denoted by A and B.T y p eAalways punishes
defective behavior (D) of his neighbors, type B never does. Thus type A is a social controller.
Apart from this, both types are the same. In particular, we assume that they are both rational
players in the neighbor game which means that both maximize individual payos given the
types of their neighbors.
We assume that punishment leads to a reduction of the individual payo to a punished
agent by an amount of p>0. Of course, punishment should be costly for the punisher, too.
However, as long as we model the punishment decision as a purely norm driven act, where
the punisher himself does not take into account his costs of punishing explicitly and as long
as the dynamics selecting amongst types does not depend on payos, these costs are obviously
irrelevant. For the rest of this paper we will stick to this assumption and model punishment as
as i m p l en o r md r i v e na c t . 7
Given the types of his neighbors an agent chooses between C and D maximizing his indi-
vidual payo. Since D is a strictly dominant strategy in the PD, his choice does not depend on
the current strategies of his neighbors but only on their types, since types determine whether
an agent punishes or not. We assume that the type of an agent can be identied by each of his
neighbors and that agents have to x one action for both encounters, i.e. they cannot treat their
neighbors dierently. Since defection gives a gain of 1 in each single game with one neighbor,
an agent will choose D as long as the value of p times the number of neighbors that are of type
A does not exceed his total gain of 2. Thus, if p is small (p<1) it is always optimal for an
agent to defect, even if he is punished by both of his neighbors. If p is large (p>2) it is never
optimal to defect if at least one neighbor is of type A. In the intermediate case (1 <p<2) the
number of A{types determines behavior. If only one neighbor is of type A it is still optimal to
defect. If both are of type A it is optimal to cooperate.
This leads us to an important distinction that has to be made when talking about punish-
ment and social control. There exist two dierent control mechanisms in form of punishment
that are involved in our set{up. One form is executed punishment, the other threatened pun-
ishment. To understand this distinction consider an agent who has at least one neighbor of
type A. In that case, there is always a threat of punishment. Whether this threat deters de-
fection depends on the amount of punishment, p, and on the question whether also the second
neighbor is a controller. If the constellation makes cooperation optimal, the threat implies
perfect deterrence and punishment remains only to be threatened. It is not executed. This is
what we mean when we speak of threatened punishment (even though punishment starts, of
7In a follow{up study we describe a model of social control where agents take into account the costs of
punishment explicitly.
6course, always as being a threat). In case the constellation does not yield deterrence, the agent,
facing the threat of punishment, will defect nevertheless and the punishment will be executed.
In that sense, executed punishment and (merely) threatened punishment exclude each other.
Executed punishment can only occur after defection, while threatened punishment makes the
agent cooperating.
Rather than being exogeneously xed we assume the LC system to evolve endogenously
through time. That is, we want to study decentralizedsocial control where the set of controllers
is subject to a permanent change. At any instant in time every agent can become a controller
but in the same way, he may also change again and stop being a controller. The channel that
governs the switch towards becoming a controller shall be education. Precisely, we look at
education through controlling where the idea we pursue is the following: if a non{controlling
agent gets controlled by one of his neighbors, there is a strictly positive probability for him
to become a controller, too. At the same time, once an agent has become a social controller
there is again a force back towards the situation of not being a controller anymore. This force
is going to be modelled as a constant drift. The main object of this paper is to analyze the
eect of this simple educational mechanism | rst, on the evolution of the LC system itself
and second, on the play of the neighbor game.
If we look at the two forms of social control, executed and threatened punishment, it does
not seem clear which of these forms may have a greater eect as an educational mechanism.
In view of our assumptions on the dynamics of the system of LC we may ask, which of these
forms makes an agent under control more likely to become a social controller, too? The answer
is ambiguous. For example, one could argue that executed punishment could have the greater
educational eect since it involves the actual pain of being punished. On the other hand, one
might say that the impact of threatened punishment might be greater as it has the power to
alter behavior.
Since it is not obvious which is the correct answer and since, in fact, the correct answer
might be case dependent we will consider dierent situations, allowing an understanding of
the complete picture. In particular, we will analyze cases where executed punishment and
threatened punishment have similar educational eects, as well as constellations where their
educational impacts dier.
Technically, we model the system of local control (LC) as a continuous time Markov process
with state space being the collection of all possible arrangements of controllers. Dene X :=
fA;BgZ. X is the collection of all possible arrangements of A{a n dB{types over the population
of agents located on the set of integers Z. LC is then dened through a Markov process ftgt0
where at any time t 2 IR
+
0 ; tis an element of X.D e n o t eb y t ( x ) the type of agent x given
the state of the process t. Since time is a continuous parameter in this model transition
probabilities for the Markov process can be described by some real{valued functions c(x;t),
7called ﬂip rates, that depend on x 2 Za n d t2X. The family of Markov processes we consider
in this context belong to the class of interacting particle systems.8 Flip rates determine the
probability that given a state of the process t an agent x `ﬂips' his type t(x)w i t h i na n
innitesimally short period of time. Precisely,
Prob[t+s(x) 6= t(x)] = c(x;t)  s + o(s)f o r s # 0 ; (1)
The probability for agent x to ﬂip within a time interval [t;t+s] equals the product of the
ﬂip rate at time t times the length of the interval s plus a term vanishing of order s as s goes
to zero.
Like in the case of a standard Poisson process, ﬂip rates in [0;1] and ﬂip probabilities
in [0;1] form a monotone relation: the higher the rate the higher is the probability of ﬂipping
within a short period of time. For example, a ﬂip rate equal to innity implies an instantaneous
ﬂip. Here the probability of ﬂipping equals one. On the other hand, a ﬂip rate equal to zero
corresponds to a no ﬂip situation where the probability of ﬂipping is zero.
As mentioned above we assume the mechanism for an agent to ﬂip from a B{type to an
A{type (i.e. from a non{controller to a controller) to be based on education through control by
neighbors. The reverse ﬂip from an A{type to a B{type is modelled by a constant drift term.
Let nA
t (x) 2f 0 ;1 ;2 gdenote the number of neighbors of agent x that are of type A at time t.






t( x ) ;p)i f t ( x )=B
 if t(x)=A:
(2)
The parameter >0 models the constant drift from an A{type to a B{type. The function
f models the ﬂip from a non{controller to a controller, i.e. from a B{type to an A{type.
Capturing the educational eect of being controlled by neighbors it depends both on the number
of controllers in the neighborhood and on the punishment level p.
In our model we distinguish between executed punishment and threatened punishment by
assuming that the educational eect of executed punishment results into a ﬂip rate >0,
while the impact of threatened punishment results into a ﬂip rate >0. Since agents are
payo-maximizers in the neighbor game the fact whether punishment is executed or threatened
depends exclusively on the number of neighboring A{types and the level of punishment. This
leads to the following denition of f:
8See Liggett (1985) for an outstanding introduction to this class of models.
8f(n;p): =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0i fn =0
 if p<1^n1
 if 1 <p<2^n=1
 if 1 <p<2^n=2
 if p>2^n1 :
(3)
If there is no A{type among neighbors, (n = 0), there is obviously no control and thus
no punishment. Therefore ﬂip rates are zero. If there is at least one A{type around, (n 
1), there is either executed punishment or threatened punishment, depending on the level of
punishment and the number of controllers. If the level of punishment is small (p<1) defection
is optimal independent on whether n equals one or two. Therefore punishment is executed
punishment which leads to a ﬂip rate equal to . If the punishment level lies between one and
two, punishment is executed if and only if exactly one neighbor is of type A. In this case the
ﬂip rate has again a value of . As soon as both neighbors are controllers (n =2 )i ti sr a t i o n a l
to cooperate and then punishment turns into threatened punishment which, by assumption,
has an eect of . If the punishment level is even larger (p>2) cooperation is optimal if there
is at least one A{type around and then punishment is always threatened punishment leading
again to a ﬂip rate equal to .9
We next turn to an analysis of the model.
3 Analysis and Results
The main question is the following: What are the eects of the simple educational mechanisms
described above, rst on the endogenous evolution of the system of local control (LC) and
second on the play of the neighbor game? Obviously, the state of no{control,w h e r e t( x )=B
for every agent x 2 Z, is an absorbing state. Denote this state by ;. We are interested in the
probability for LC to get around the absorbing state of no{control. That is we are going to
analyze the probability for the set of controllers to be nonempty at any time t  0. The next
denition claries the terms we are going to consider.
Denition 1 The system of local control (LC) survives if for every initial state 0 6= ; the
probability for ftgt0 not to enter the absorbing state of no{control ; is strictly positive. The
9Note, that we do not consider cumulative punishment eects in this model. If, e.g., p<1 such that every
punishment is executed, there is no dierence between a situation where only one neighbor is punishing and
t h eo n ew h e r eb o t ha r eo ft y p eAand punish. The only thing that matters, is whether there is at least one
neighbor that punishes and which kind of punishment is at work.
9system breaks down if the state of no{control is reached almost surely for every initial state.
LC is successful if it survives and (local) cooperation can be observed. The system is weakly
successful if local cooperation is observed but survival can not be guaranteed.
Remark: We will provide conditions for survival and breakdown of LC. Once these con-
ditions are fullled it can be shown that there exists a class of initial states for which the
probability not to enter the state ; is even equal to one. The class consists of those initial
states that almost surely contain innitely many agents of type A. Examples are Dirac dis-
tributions putting probability one on a state with innitely many agents being of type A or
Bernoulli product measures, where every agent independently of other agents is of type A with
some strictly positive probability. In view of policy analysis this class appears of particular
interest because one can ensure that almost surely the set of controllers is never empty. To
guarantee this result, note that no assumption on the local spread, i.e. the density or concen-
tration of A{types within the population has to be made. The sucient condition on the set
of controllers is that it shall have at least some positive measure within the innite space Z.10
We are now going to analyze the possibility for survival and breakdown, success and weak
success depending on the values of the parameters in the model, i.e. depending on ;;; and
p. The analytical result that will work as the main tool is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For every >0 ,
(i) there exists a value b() > 0 such that the system of local control breaks down if for every
n 2f 0 ;1 ;2 gand p 2 (0;1) nf 1 ;2 g: f( n;p) <b (  ) ,
(ii) there exists a value s() < 1 such that the system survives if for every n 2f 0 ; 1 ; 2 g
and p 2 (0;1) nf 1 ;2 g: f( n;p) >s (  ) .
(iii) It holds that   b()  s()  4.
The proof of Lemma 2 is referred to the appendix at the end of the paper. At this point we
would like to mention only that from the proof it can be observed that the statement in Lemma
2 can be strengthened in the sense that both conditions for survival and for breakdown can be
relaxed. However, since we are not going to focus on this property in this paper the statement
as it is given now is enough.
Lemma 2 puts relative bounds on the rates that govern the ﬂip from a B{type to an A{type
in order to observe either a breakdown or a survival of the system of local control. Moreover,
these bounds are given in relative terms. Thus, in particular, in order to get survival it is not
necessary for the drift term eventually to reach zero. We could state the result the other way
round: For every degree of educational eect there exists a strictly positive value such that
10Consider any nite translation invariant measure  on Z. Then for every nite subset S  Z; ( S )=0 .
10survival has a chance if only the drift is smaller than this critical value. This feature seems
exceptionally nice since many models in the evolutionary literature focus on results where drift
or mutations eventually must decrease to zero. In our model this is not necessary. There
are always agents that at some time t refuse to be controllers any longer. Hence, there is a
permanent change within the set of controllers. The only thing that matters is that overall
there is enough control dispersed among agents in the society.
Lemma 2 suggests that we have to consider four dierent cases. In the rst case educational
impacts of both executed and threatened punishment are small, while in the second case both
eects are large. In the third case the eect of executed punishment is small but the eect of
threatened punishment is large. In the fourth case the eect of executed punishment is large
but the impact of threatened punishment is small. We will establish four propositions, each
dealing with one of the four cases. This will also bring the punishment level p back into the
discussion.
Proposition 3 If both educational forces as small, i.e. if maxf;g <b (  ) , local control will
always break down regardless of the punishment level.
Proof: The claim follows directly from Lemma 2, part (i).
2
Proposition 3 cannot be surprising. If there are no considerable forces turning non{
controllers into controllers, given the constant drift towards no{control, controllers will dis-
appear pretty soon. Once they disappeared, it will always be optimal to play defection.
Proposition 4 If both educational forces are strong, i.e. if minf;g >s (  ) , local control will
survive regardless of the punishment level. However, if the punishment level is too small, i.e.
if p<1 , LC will not be successful. If, instead, p>1 , LC will always be successful.
Proof: The rst claim follows again directly from Lemma 2, part (ii), while the last two claims
follow from the observation that when both neighbors are of type A it is always rational to play
defection if p<1 and to cooperate if p>1.
2
Again the proposition seems intuitive. If both educational forces are strong more and
more agents will become controllers be it through threatened or through executed punishment.
Eventually, there will be so many controllers that any serious punishment level (p>1) will
ensure non{deviant behavior.
Next we turn to the case where one educational force is strong and the other is weak. Here
we will see that it will crucially matter whether in fact executed punishment is the strong force
or threatened punishment is the strong force. We start with the latter.
11Proposition 5 If threatened punishment is the strong force while the eect of executed pun-
ishment is weak, i.e. if >s (  )and <b (  ) , LC breaks down for p<1 , it is weakly successful
for 1 <p<2 , and it is successful for p>2 .
Proof: The claims for p<1a n dp>2 are again contained in Lemma 2, part (i) and (ii),
since executed punishment is at work if p<1, and threatened punishment applies if p>2,
regardless of the number of controlling neighbors. The intermediate case (1 <p<2) is more
tricky, because unfortunately Lemma 2 is of no help. In order to see why survival can not
be guaranteed consider the situation where a B{type has only one neighboring A{type. Since
punishment is executed in this situation and <b (  ), the A{type is more likely to drift to a
B{type before education can work leading the B{type to become an A{type. The result is a
neighborhood of no{control. On the other hand, breakdown does not happen either. Consider
the situation of a B{type surrounded by two A{types. In this case, punishment is threatened
punishment and the B{type cooperates. Since by assumption the resulting force is strong,
i.e. >s (  )t h eB {type has a high probability to become an A{type before one of the A{
types drifts into a B{type. Thus, with high probability the neighborhood turns into complete
control. Still, if this neighborhood is a local island within a set of B{types, in particular if
the minimal distance to the next A{type is greater than two, the situations at the borders of
the neighborhood are of the kind described above. In consequence, the island will eventually
break down again. This shows that the only forces for survival rely on pairs of A{types that
surround a single B{type. This, however, is not enough to guarantee survival. That LC is still
weakly successful is based on the fact that whenever both neighbors are of type A it is optimal
to cooperate. Thus local cooperation can be observed.
2
In order to understand the intuition of the proposition consider a legislator that may in-
ﬂuence the value of the punishment level p. Proposition 5 shows that whenever threatened
punishment is the strong force it is optimal for the legislator to increase the punishment level.
The reason is that both in the neighborgame incentives are moved towards cooperation and
the educational impact of punishment is increased which in consequence sustains the system of
control. That the latter does not necessarily always hold true can be seen from the following
proposition where the asymmetry between  and  is turned the other way round.
Proposition 6 If executed punishment is the strong force while the eect of threatened pun-
ishment is weak, i.e. if >s (  )and <b (  ) , LC survives but is not successful for p<1 ,i ti s
weakly successful for 1 <p<2 , and it breaks down for p>2 .
Proof: Similarly to above the extreme claims follow again from Lemma 2, part (i) and (ii).
If p<1 agents exclusively control by executed punishment. If p>2 punishment is always
threatened punishment. In both cases the number of controlling neighbors is irrelevant. The
intermediate case where 1 <p<2 is again the complicated one. Consider a neighborhood
12where a B{type is surrounded by two A{ t y p e s .I ns u c has i t u a t i o nt h eB {type cooperates and
punishment is threatened, which has an eect of .S i n c e  is small with a high probability
one of the A{types will drift into a B{types before the B{type gets educated and ﬂips to an
A{type. In consequence, the neighborhood turns into two B{types next to an A{type. But
now the B{type in the middle starts defecting and therefore experiences executed punishment
by his single neighboring A{type. As executed punishment has a strong force in this set{up
it becomes more likely that now the B{type will ﬂip into an A{type before the remaining A{
type drifts into a B{type, too. (As his former colleague has done before.) Thus, we get two
A{types next to a single B{type. Just as in the case of proposition 5 where it were the pairs
of A{types that sustained the spread of controllers it is now a single A{type that builds the
stronger force. However, in any situation that involves a pair of A{types surrounding some
B{type controllers are extremely vulnerable. Therefore survival in the sense of not reaching
the state of no{control with positive probability for every initial state seems out of reach and
can not be guaranteed. Still, compared with the situation in proposition 5 chances seem to be
better than before. Moreover, by the same reasoning as above cooperation can be observed and
thus LC is weakly successful.
2
Policy trap
Propostion 6 reveals an important feature of our model that is based on the possibility of type
change and the distinction between dierent forms of punishment as its main characteristic.
This feature involves what we call a policy trap.
As before consider again a legislator that may want to change the value of p. Let us suppose
that the initial situation is such that p<1. The legislator may see that there is a lot of control
in the population, A{types survive since  is large enough. However, nobody cooperates since
the punishment level is too low. In consequence, he may want to increase p in order to give
cooperation a chance. Suppose now that rst he increases p to a level where 1 <p<2. In
this situation cooperation is optimal if and only if both neighbors are controllers. If only one
neighbor is of type A defection is still a dominant strategy. Now, if both neighbors are of
type A successful control is exercised (per denitionem) by threatened punishment. But, by
assumption this has a lower educational eect. In fact, these states where two A{types surround
one B{type are the most unstable and therefore situations that have high frequency involve
only one single controller within a neighborhood. Yet, in these situations it is not optimal to
cooperate. Thus, the legislator may come to the conclusion that the punishment level is still
too low since most of the situations where control is involved are not successful.
Yet, if p>2 the situation becomes even worse. Although in the short run, the policy looks
extremely appealing, since everybody cooperates if only one controller is around, eventually this
leads into a trap. If p>2, all control is exercised by threatened punishment. By assumption
13this has an educational eect only of , which is not enough to have a B{type ﬂipping to
an A{type with a higher probability than his controllers drifting to a B{type. Still, this is
necessary to give the system of LC a chance for survival, at all. In consequence, in the long
run the system breaks down. All A{types disappear, i.e. nobody is left to control. Hence,
nobody cooperates. The situation is worse than before and even worse than the one we started
from. While at the beginning there was at least a system of control, which, however, was not
successful, we are now in a state where the system is not only not successful but where it does
not even exist anymore.
This shows that as long as the legislator has no inﬂuence on the educational forces themselves
the best he can do is keeping the punishment level between 1 and 2. Although he pays for
obtaining local cooperation by loosing survival of LC he nevertheless stays away from a complete
breakdown of the system. In this set{up the second{best solution in form of weak success of
LC is all he can get.
Figure 2 summarizes our ndings.
p<11 <p<22 <p
(C1) − − −
(C2)  ++ ++
(C3) − + ++
(C4)  + −
(− =b r e a k d o w n ;= survival; ++ = success; + = weak success;
C1: maxf;g <b (  ); C2: minf;g >s (  ); C3: <b (  )s (  )< ;C 4 :<b (  )s (  )< .)
Figure 2: The eects of the punishment level p in the four dierent cases.
4 Conclusion
We have analyzed a system of so{called local control (LC), where the task of enforcement of
punishment lies in the hands of individuals in the society rather than in the hand of a centrally
organized institution. Having in mind the idea of social engineering we have studied a world
where the survival of LC is made as dicult as possible. First, all agents are utility maximizers
and second, there is a constant (psychological) force producing a drift towards a state of no{
control. In spite of these assumptions it is possible to give conditions such that LC has, indeed, a
14strictly positive chance of survival for everyinitial state of the society. The important interactive
mechanism between agents that produces this result is education through punishment. Non{
controlling agents may become controllers when they experience control themselves. With
this respect, we have distinguished between executed and threatened punishment. Although
survival of LC is possible, the alternative, breakdown of LC, must not be ignored. For every
degree of the educational eect of experienced control there exists a suciently strong drift
towards no{control that eventually leads the system to a complete breakdown of control. This
feature becomesparticularly important in a situation where executedpunishmentshave stronger
impacts than mere threats. In this case the interplaybetween types and incentivesform a policy
trap, where any legal or social policy focussing on punishment levels alone can do more harm
to the situation than rst economic insights would have let expected.
15Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: The system of LC ftgt0 with ﬂip rates dened via function f (see






 if l = r =1
f(1;p)
 if l =1 o r r=1 a n d l+r>2
0i f l  2a n dr  2 :
(4)
The value of (l;r) equals, up to multiplication by , the value of the ﬂip rate c(x;t), when
t(x)=B ,lis the distance to the nearest A{type to the left and r is the distance to the nearest
A{type to the right.11
For 1  n<1consider the collection of numbers
b(n)=
X
l + r = n +1
(l;r): (5)
Obviously,








Theorem 5.5., chapter VII of Liggett (1985) assures that the system breaks down if (8)
holds. Thus equivalently, condition (9) is sucient to ensure a breakdown of the system of
LC. This proves already the existence of a value b() > 0 such that the system breaks down
if f(n;p) <b (  ) for every n 2f 1 ;2 g . So far, we know from (9) that b() 

2. However, it is
possible to improve this bound. The idea is to compare the LC with some other nearest{particle
system for which the breakdown condition is already better known. In fact, this approach will
allow us to prove the second claim, too. The other particle system is the contact process. (See
Liggett (1985), chapter VI.)





2  if l = r =1
 if l =1 o r r=1 a n d l+r>2
0i f l  2a n dr  2 :
(8)
11A nearest{particle system is commonly dened with a constant drift term equal to 1 instead of .T h e
multiplication of ﬂip rates by a constant term | in our case by  | has no qualitative eect other than a
change of the time scale.
16Now the better bound for b() relies on the fact that the system of LC is dominated by the
contact process with parameter  if both
f(1;p)
   and
f(2;p)
  2. Domination means that
for any arrangement of types, every B{type is at most as likely to ﬂip under the LC system as
under the contact process. That is, (l;r)  ~ (l;r) for any selection of l and r.
For the contact process it is well{know that there exists a critical value  such that for
every < the process breaks down and for every > the process can survive. In the
one{dimensional case it is possible to show that this critical value has a lower bound of 1.18
and an upper bound of 2.12 Moreover, if > any translation invariant initial distribution
that puts mass zero on the no{control state ; converges weakly to an invariant distribution
 that has the property that with strictly positive probability any agent is of type A and,
in consequence, with probability one at least one agent in the population is of type A.( S e e
chapter VI of Liggett (1985).)
Thus taking 1 as a lower bound for , f(1;p)<and f(2;p)<2is a sucient condition
for the LC system to be dominated by a contact process that breaks down. This proves that
b()  .
The second claim follows from the same dominance argumentation, this time the other way
round. We take 2 as an upper bound for .T h e nf (1;p)>2and f(2;p)>4are sucient
conditions for the LC system to dominate itself a contact process that can survive. Hence, the
LC system can survive, too, which proves already the existence of a value s() < 1 such that
the system can survive if f(n;p) >s (  ) for every n 2f 1 ;2 g . Furthermore, it follows also that
s()  4.
2
12An approximation done by Brower et al. (1978) obtains a value of   1:6494.
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